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Michael T. Hertz*

Oy Nokia and Order XI:
Notes On Unstructured
Bases of Jurisdiction

In Oy Nokia Ab v. The Ship "Martha Russ" 1the Trial Division of
the Federal Court was faced with the issue of its power to authorize
service of a statement of claim out of the jurisdiction. Before the
court stood the plaintiff, Oy Nokia Ab, a Finnish corporation, and
the defendants, the German registered ship "Martha Russ", her
German corporate owners, E. Russ & Co., a second ship, the Dutch
"Korendyk", and the latter's owners, the Dutch corporation
Nederlandsche-Ameri-Kaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij, N.V.
Oy Nokia's claim sounded in both tort and breach of contract in that
the defendants had allegedly delivered Oy Nokia's cargo to
Vancouver in damaged condition.
Oy Nokia had sold serial capacitators to British Columbia Hydro.
The goods were loaded on the "Martha Russ" in Finland and
covered by a bill of lading for carriage to Germany. Upon arrival of
the German ship in Hamburg, E. Russ & Co. notified the plaintiff's
German agents. At the agents' direction, the cargo was loaded on
barges ordered and paid for by the agents and the barges were towed
from the "Martha Russ" to the "Korendyk". The goods were not
inspected in Hamburg (indeed, they were not inspected until
delivered in Vancouver),2 but were charged on board the Dutch ship
and covered by a bill of lading from Hamburg to Vancouver issued
by or on behalf of the Dutch owners of the "Korendyk". The bills
of lading issued by the German and Dutch companies were
completely separate, and there was no allegation of any connection
between the two companies. The German ship and her owners
participated no further in the carriage or handling of Oy Nokia's
cargo once it was loaded on the barges in Hamburg.
When the capacitators were discovered to be damaged, the
plaintiff brought its action against both the German and Dutch ships
*Michael T. Hertz, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. [1973] F.C. 394; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 (Tr. Div.), affd [1974] 1 F.C. 410; 51
D.L.R. (3d) 632 (C.A.).
2. The Federal Court of Appeal emphasized that "the plaintiff was aware before
the goods left Germany that damage had been sustained." [1974] 1 F.C. 410 at
414;51 D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 635, but the lower court decision does not allude to this
fact.
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and their corporate owners. 3 The basis of the Federal Court's
jurisdiction over the Dutch ship and its corporate owner is not clear
and apparently was not in dispute. It appears, however, that service
was effected against them within Canada. 4 The German ship had
not been arrested and service of process, which was effected in
Germany against it and its corporate owner, had been authorized by
order of the Federal Court. After entering a conditional appearance,
these defendants applied to the court seeking to set aside the service
of the statement of claim.
The argument for the German defendants on this motion was
simple: the action had been brought against them in personam and
jursidiction -

if any there were -

must be in personam. If the

plaintiff's claim were in contract, then in fact the contract was made
and performed completely outside Canada and the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Any breach of that contract necessarily
occurred outside Canada as well. If there were fault or negligence
on the part of the German defendants, then it also occurred outside
Canada. The only fact which could provide the nexus of jurisdiction
was that the damaged goods ultimately had entered Canada.
Plaintiff disagreed and relied upon section 22 of the Federal
CourtAct, 5 which provided inter alia for the Federal Court's Trial
Division to have "jurisdiction with respect to any claim or question
arising out of . .

.

. (h) any claim for loss or damage to goods

carried in or on a ship, .... ",6 This same section specifically
3. The problem of the plaintiff who has a damage claim against one of several
concurrent handlers of goods is a classic one. For instance, in Beaver Lamb &
Shearling Co. Ltd. v. Sun Insurance Office, [1951] O.R. 401; [1951] 3 D.L.R. 470
(H.C.), the plaintiff attempted to call in the Australian vendor of sheepskins as a
"necessary and proper party" to plaintiffs suit against the insurer of the carrier of
the sheepskins from Sydney to Ontario. Damage to the skins had been sustained
either on the ocean voyage or else prior to the delivery to that carrier, and in the
latter case the vendor would have been the responsible party. The court refused to
allow service on the Australian vendor, stating that plaintiff really had two separate
and distinct causes of action, and the fact that there was a common question of fact
in the cases against each defendant was not determinative. In Oy Nokia the equities
of the situation were in plaintiffs disfavor because it was apparently aware that
some damage had been sustained before the goods left Germany. Note 2, supra.
Plaintiff's case against the Dutch defendants was consequently no real case at all.
In similar circumstances under Order 11-type rules dealing with the right to serve
"necessary and proper parties" ex juris, the courts have disallowed such service.
E.g., Witted v. Galbraith, [1893] 1 Q.B. 577 (C.A.).
4. [1974]1 F.C. 410 at 413; 51 D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 634 (C.A.).
5. R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10.
6. Section 22 reads as follows:
(1) The Trial Division has concurrent original jurisdiction as well between
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provided that the court's jurisdiction is applicable "(a) in relation to
all ships whether Canadian or not and wherever the residence or
domicile of the owners may be.

.

. " and "(c) in relation to all

claims whether arising on the high seas or within the limits of the
territorial, internal or other waters of Canada or elsewhere. .... "
Since the claim was for damages to goods "carried in or on a
ship", the plaintiff argued that its case fell literally within the words
of the statute. But, the trial court remarked, accepting plaintiffs
contention would mean that the Trial Division would have
jurisdiction over any cargo damage claim under any bill of lading
issued by anyone anywhere regardless of where the damage
occurred, so long as the goods ultimately arrived in Canada. 7 The
trial court pointed out that

a basic principle in asserting jurisdiction over foreigners [is] that
there must be some legal nexus between the foreign defendants
and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. This nexus must arise
from some act, conduct, or agreement by the foreign defendant
subject and subject as otherwise, in all cases in which a claim for relief is made
or a remedy sought under or by virtue of Canadian maritime law or any other
law of Canada relating to any matter coming within the class of subject of
navigation and shipping, except to the extent that jurisdiction has been
otherwise specially assigned.
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), it is hereby declared for
greater certainty that the Trial Division has jurisdiction with respect to any claim
or question arising out of one of more of the following:
...
(h) any claim for loss of or damage to goods carried in or on a ship
including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, loss of or damage
to passengers' baggage or personal effects;...
(3) For greater certainty, it is hereby declared that the jurisdiction conferred on
the Court by this section is applicable
(a) in relation to all ships whether Canadian or not and wherever the
residence or domicile of the owners may be;
... (c) in relation to all claims whether arising on the high seas or within
the limits of the territorial, internal or other waters of Canada or elsewhere
7. [1973] F.C. 394 at 398; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 600. Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen
(1953), 345 U.S. 572 at 576-577; 73 S. Ct. 921 at 925, where it was argued that a
Danish seaman working on a Danish registered ship owned by Danes had a right of
action under American law because the Jones Act by its own terms extended an
American law remedy to "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment." Interpreted literally, the United States Supreme Court
said, the statute would imply that "Congress has extended our law and opened our
courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere in the world in service of
watercraft of every foreign nation - a hand on a Chinese junk, never outside
Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal meaning." The Court went on to
limit the "literal catholicity" of the statute's terminology.
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which is or can be related in personam to the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. 8
The court evidently felt that section 22 of the FederalCourtAct was
not an assertion of jurisdiction over persons but a definition of the
competency of the court over subject-matter. 9 The plaintiff's
argument was therefore one which attempted to resolve issues of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by use of a section
defining the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.
Subject-MatterJurisdictionof the FederalCourt inAdmiralty
Before turning to the court's treatment of the problem of jurisdiction
over persons, we might examine for a moment the limits of
subject-matter competence under the Federal CourtAct. At the time
of the Trial Division's decision in Oy Nokia, the parameters of
subject-matter jurisdiction were not clear. In Anglophoto Ltd. v.
The Ship "Ferncliff', 10 also decided by the trial judge of the Oy
Nokia case, the court dealt with the question as to whether it had
jurisdiction under section 22 over the operator of a warehouse in
Tacoma, Washington. Goods had been bound for Vancouver under
a bill of lading from Japan to Vancouver with transshipment
intended to Montreal, but a Vancouver dock strike had forced
diversion of the goods to the Tacoma warehouse. Ultimately, when
the goods arrived in Montreal, it was discovered that part of the
shipment was missing. The plaintiff served all parties who might
have been responsible for the loss, including the ship, the overland
carrier which had transported the goods from Tacoma to Canada,
and the Tacoma warehouseman. The court set aside service exjuris
against the warehouseman, holding that, since the bill of lading was
not a through bill, it did not fall within the terms of section 22(2). 11
In a case after Oy Nokia, 12 however, the same judge was forced to
recognize that his holding in Anglophoto was probably wrong.
8. [1973] F.C. 394 at 399; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 601.
9. [1973] P.C. 394 at 398; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 600-601.
10. [1972] F.C. 1337 (Tr. Div.).
11. Section 22(2) (f) specifies the Trial Division's jurisdiction as extending to
"any claim arising out of an agreement relating to the carriage of goods on a ship
under a through bill of lading or in respect of which a through bill of lading is
intended to be issued, for loss or damage to goods occurring at any time or place
during transit." The trial court felt that this clause excluded an action where the bill
was not a through bill.
12. McQuarrie v. The "U.S.S. American Ranger", [1974] 1 F.C. 42 at 43 (Tr.
Div.).
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Intervening after Oy Nokia had been the decision of the Federal
Court of Appeal in The Robert Simpson Montreal Ltd. v.
Hamburg-Amerika Linie Norddeutscher.13 In that case, 14 the trial
judge had interpreted section 22 as depriving his court of
subject-matter jurisdiction over a third-party claim made by the
defendants against a Canadian warehouseman who had taken
possession of goods following an ocean voyage. As in the
Anglophoto case, that trial court relied on the fact that there was no
through bill of lading alleged and ruled that the case would not fall
within the ambit of section 22(2) of the Act.
The Federal Court of Appeal rejected this reasoning and held that
subject-matter competence of the Trial Division was, under section
22, as broad as Parliament's constitutional power over "Navigation
and Shipping."' 5 The court arrived at this conclusion by reading
section 22(1) together with section 2(j). 16
Section 22(1), said the court, states that the Trial Division's
jurisdiction extends to all cases "in which a claim for relief is made
...

under or by virtue of Canadian maritime law or any other law

of Canada relating to any matter coming within the class of subject
of navigation and shipping ...... " Under section 2(b) of the Act,
"Canadian maritime law" constitutes such Canadian admiralty law
as existed prior to the Act. 17 But "Laws of Canada" under section
2(j) "has the same meaning as those words have in section 101 of
the BritishNorth America Act, 1867," the court noted. 18 Therefore,
it concluded, "those words in that section would seem to embrace
not only a statute actually enacted by the Parliament of Canada but
also a law 'that it would be competent for the Parliament of Canada
to enact, modify or amend."' 19
13. [1973] F.C. 1356; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 267 (C.A.).
14. [1973] F.C. 304 (Tr. Div.).
at 1361; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 267 at 273. See British North
15. [1973] F.C. 13.5.6
America Act, R.S.C. 1970 (App.) No. 5, s. 91 (10).
16. Section 2 reads: "In this Act .... ()'laws of Canada' has the same meaning
as those words have in section 101 of The BritishNorth America Act, 1867." (The
letters ascribed to the subsections appear in S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1, s. 2 but not in
R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 2).
17. Section 2(b) reads: " ' Canadian maritime law' means the law that was
administered by the Exchequer Court of Canada on its Admiralty side by virtue of
the Admiralty Act or any other statute, or that would have been so administered if
that Court had had, on its Admiralty side, unlimited jurisdiction in relation to
maritime and admiralty matters, as that law has been altered by this or any other
Act of the Parliament of Canada."
18. [1973] F.C. 1356 at 1361; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 267 at 272.
19. Id., citing Consolidated Distilleries Ltd. v. Consolidated Exporters Corp.
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In contrast, in Oy Nokia the trial court's problem was not
subject-matter competence. Nor did the Federal Court of Appeal, in
reviewing the decision of the court below, 20 question the matter of
subject-matter competence, although the appellate court did not
specifically approve the trial judge's decision. But there was really
nothing to question concerning the subject-matter competence of the
Trial Division. If the "Martha Russ" had been a Canadian ship
owned by Canadians, and yet had operated solely between Finland
and Hamburg, it would appear quite clear that a Canadian court
would have been competent to deal with a claim regarding harm to
transported goods.
The decision in The Robert Simpson Montreal Ltd. consequently
makes the subject-matter competence of the Trial Division rest
solely on parliamentary constitutional limitations. Those limits are
broad and, due to a lack of case law, ill-defined. Moreover, the
Court's jurisdiction, being directly tied to the British North America
Act, will vary with decisions concerning constitutional power. 2 1 In
making this decision, the Federal Court of Appeal freed the Trial
Ltd., [1930] S.C.R. 531 at 535; [1930] 3 D.L.R. 704 at 707 (Anglin, C.J.C.),
which involved the jurisdiction of the former Exchequer Court and that court's
power to promulgate a rule on the basis of its jurisdiction "in all cases relating to
" See
the revenue in which it is sought to enforce any law of Canada ....
Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 34, s. 30. The Supreme Court stated,
"While there can be no doubt that the powers of Parliament under section 101 [of
the British North America Act, 1867] are of an overriding character, when the
matter dealt with is within the legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada,
it seems equally clear that they do not enable it to set up a court competent to deal
with matters purely of civil right as between subject and subject. While the law,
under which the defendant in the present instance seeks to impose a liability on the
third party to indemnify it by virtue of a contract between them, is a law of Canada
in the sense that it is in force in Canada, it is not of law of Canadain the sense that
it would be competent for the Parliamentof Canada to enact, modijfy, or amend
it." (Emphasis added). Section 101 of the BritishNorth America Act, 1867, reads
"The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time
to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General
Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for
the better administration of the Laws of Canada."
In accord with The Robert Simpson MontrealLtd. are Anglophoto Ltd. v. The
Ship "Ikaros", [1974] 1 F.C. 327 (C.A.), rev'g [1973] F.C. 483 (Tr. Div.), and
Antares Shipping Corp. v. The "Capricorn", [1973] F.C. 955 (Tr. Div.).
20. [197431 F.C. 410; 51 D.L.R. (3d) 632 (C.A.).
21. See, e.g., CanadianFur Co. (N.A.) v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, [1974] 2
F.C. 944 (Tr. Div.) (discussing whether navigation by air fell within "navigation
and shipping") and Sumitomo Shoji Canada Ltd. v. The Ship "Juzan Maru",
[1974] 2 F.C. 488 (Tr. Div.) (discussing whether a warehouseman fell within
"navigation and shipping").
Cf. C. Lyon, Old Statutes andNew Constitution (1944), 44 Colum. L. Rev. 599,
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Division from the constraints of a structured set of rules with respect
to subject matter, a decision which foreshadowed to some extent an
analogous result in the Oy Nokia appeal decision concerning
jurisdiction over defendants exjuris.
The Decision in Oy Nokia on Appeal
The specific problem raised in Oy Nokia itself concerns the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court over the persons of the German
defendants. Under the Federal Court Act, the Trial Division may
22
adjudicate in personam within its subject-matter competency.
But, that being said, there must still be legislation from which the
court derives power to oblige those defendants to come to Canada
and defend. The trial court in Oy Nokia was of a view that, in
promulgating the Federal Court Act, Parliament did not intend "to23
confer a jurisdiction over foreigners which did not exist before"
in admiralty actions.
The traditional foundation of English jurisdiction in personam
was the service of process upon the defendant, but that service,
under the common law, was limited to service within the territorial
confines of the court. 24 A writ served out of the jurisdiction was
"'mere waste paper." ' 25 The resulting impractical limitation upon
the power of the common law courts to hear cases over absent
defendants resulted in the Common Law ProcedureAct of 1852.26
The exercise of this power to summon absent defendants is now
governed by Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 for
ordinary actions and by Order 75 for admiralty actions.27 Rules
similar to the English formulation may be found in most of the
Commonwealth countries.28
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Court in 1970, admiralty
matters were brought in the former Exchequer Court under section
dealing with the "accordian effect" of American statutes which were tied to
constitutional parameters.
22. R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 42.
23. [1973] F.C. 394 at 402; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 604 (Tr. Div.).
24. G. Cheshire & P. North, Cheshire's Private International Law (8th ed.
London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1970) at 78 [hereinafter Cheshire].
25. McGlew v. New South Wales Malting Co. (1918), 25 C.L.R. 416 at 420.
26. Common Law ProcedureAct, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., 76.
27. The power to make the present rules of court stems from the Supreme Court of
Judicature(Consolidation)Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5., c. 49, s. 100.
28. Z. Cowan, TransientJurisdiction:A British View (1960), 9 J. Pub. L. 303 at
308.
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20 (1) of the Admiralty Act. 2

9

When the court had jurisdiction under

that section, the court could serve process exjuris under Rule 20 of
the Exchequer Court. 30 This Rule was formulated under the
authority of section 31(1) (a) of the Admiralty Act, which permitted

the Exchequer Court to make rules concerning "the service of a writ
of summons or other process out of the jurisdiction of the Court."
Rule 20 followed to a certain extent some of the English Order 11
rules. 31
29. R.S.C. 1970, c.A-1 repealed by the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd
Supp.), c. 10, s. 64 (1). Section 20 (1) reads:
An action may be instituted in any registry when
(a) the ship or property, the subject of the action, is at the time of the institution
of the action within the district or division of such registry;
(b) the owner or owners of the ship or property, or the owner or owners of the
larger numbers of shares in the ship, or the managing owner, or the ship's
husband, reside at the time of the institution of the action within the district or
division of such registry;
(c) the port of registry of the ship is within the district or divison of such
registry;
(d) the parties, so agree by a memorandum signed by them or their attorneys or
agents;
(e) the action is in personam and is founded on any breach or alleged breach
within the district or division of such registry, of any contract, wherever made,
that is one within the jurisdiction of the Court and, according to the terms
thereof, ought to be performed within such district or division; or
(f) the action is in personam and is in tort in respect of goods carried on a ship
into a port within the district or division of such registry.
30. Rule 20 of the Admiralty Rules, P.C. 1495, Can. Gaz. (Supp.), July 29, 1939,
reads:
Service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a writ of summons
or a third party notice, may be allowed by the court wherever: (a) Any relief is sought against any person domiciled or ordinarily resident
within the district or division in which the action is instituted;
(b) The action is founded on any breach or alleged breach within the district or
divison in which the action is instituted of any contract wherever made, which
according to the terms thereof ought to be performed within such district or
division;
(c) Any injunction is sought as to do anything to be done within the district or
division in which the action is instituted;
(d) Any person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party to an action
properly brought against some other person duly served within the district or
division in which the action is instituted;
(e) The action is in tort in respect of goods carried on a ship into a port within
the district or division of the registry in which the action is instituted.
31. Sumitomo Shoji CanadaLtd. v. The Ship "Wakamiyasan Maru", [1968] 1
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Aside from admiralty matters, the Exchequer Court had a rather
general power to serve process outside its territorial jurisdiction.
This power, contained in section 75 of the Exchequer Court
Act 3 2and Rule 76 of the Exchequer Court Rules 3 3was, like the
present Federal Court Rule 307,34 broadly drafted without Order
Ex. C.R. 418 at 421. Accord, Oy Nokia Ab v. The Ship "Martha Russ", [1973]
F.C. 394 at401; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 603.
32. R.S.C. 1970, c. E-11. Section 75 reads:
(1) When a defendant, whether a British subject or a foreigner, is out of the
jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court and whether in Her Majesty's dominions or
in a foreign country, the Court or a judge, upon application, supported by
affidavit or other evidence, stating that, in the belief of the deponent, the
plaintiff has a good cause of action, and showing in what place or country such
defendant is or probably may be found, may order that a notice of the
information, petition of right, or statement of claim be served on the defendant
in such place or country or within such limits as the Court or a judge thinks fit to
direct.
(2) The order shall in such case limit a time, depending on the place of service,
within which the defendant is to file his statement in defence, plea, answer,
exception or demurrer, or otherwise make his defence, according to the practice
applicable to the particular case, or obtain from the Court or a judge further time
to do so.
(3) Upon service being effected as authorized by the order, the Court has
jurisdiction to proceed and adjudicate in the cause or matter to all intents and
purposes in the same manner, to the same extent, and with the like effect as if
the defendant had been duly served within the jurisdiction of the Court.
33. Exchequer Court General Rules and Orders April 21, 1931, as amended to
April 8th, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969). Rule 76 reads:
When a defendant is out of the jurisdiction of the Court, then upon application,
supported by affidavit or other evidence, stating that in the belief of the
deponent the plaintiff has a good cause of action, and showing in what place or
country such defendant is or probably may be found, the Court may order that a
notice of the information, petition of right, statement of claim or other judicial
proceeding be served on the defendant in such place or country or within such
limits as the Court thinks fit to direct, and the order is, in such case, to limit a
time (depending on the place of service) within which the defendant is to file his
statement in defence, plea, answer or exception, or otherwise make his defence
according to the practice applicable to the particular case, or obtain from the
Court further time to do so.
The order for service and the notice for service may be in the terms of Forms 16
and 17 in the Appendix to these Rules.
34. FederalCourtRules, S.O.R. 71-68, Rule 307 reads:
(1) When a defendant, whether a Canadian citizen, British subject or a
foreigner, is out of the jurisdiction of the Court and whether in Her Majesty's
dominions or in a foreign country, the Court, upon application, supported by
affidavit or other evidence showing that, in the belief of the deponent, the
plaintiff has a good cause of action, and showing in what place or country such
defendant is or probably may be found, may order (Form 5) that a notice of the
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11-type categories and did not "set out the class of cases in which
service exjuris may be permitted." 35
The most confusing part of the trial court's decision in Oy Nokia
involves its treatment of Rule 307 of the Federal Court. That rule
states baldly that, once the plaintiff has submitted an affidavit or
other evidence showing his belief that has a good cause of action
and the place in which the defendant may be found, the Trial
Division may order service upon the defendant outside the
jurisdiction of the court, irrespective of the defendant's nationality
or where defendant may be found. Yet the Oy Nokia trial court did
not take Rule 307 at face value. Rather, it sought to determine
whether Parliment in passing the Federal Court Act conferred
jurisdiction over the person of the foreign defendant by permitting
the court to "read in" theformer Admiralty Rules, which set out
specific cases in which service exjuris was permitted. Rejecting the
notion that the Admiralty Rules constituted a part of the former
admiralty law saved by the Federal Court Act, the court held that
service exjuris was not allowed. 36 The court went even further and
said that, even if the former Admiralty Rules were "read into" the
FederalCourtAct, those Rules would not permit service exjuris in
the case at bar. 37 The court's opinion seems to mean that the lack of
Order 11-type categories within Rule 307 meant that Rule 307 must
be inapplicable.
The appeal in Oy Nokia presented three specific problems to the
Federal Court of Appeals: (1) whether the Trial Division had the
power to permit service exjuris and compel the German defendants
to appear; (2) assuming that such power existed in the court,
whether the court had the discretion to refuse to exercise that power;
and (3) whether, in the case at bar, that discretion should be
statement of claim or declaration may be served on the defendant in such place
or country or within such limits as the Court thinks fit to direct. (Form 6).
(2) An order under paragraph (1) shall fix a time, depending on the place of
service, within which the defendant is to file his defence or obtain from the
Court further time to do so.
(3) If any problem arises concerning service of an originating document in a
matter other than an action, an application may be made to the Court for
directions.

35. OyNokiaAb v. The Ship "Martha Russ", [1973] F.C. 394, at 401; 37 D.L.R.
(3d) 597 at 603 (Tr. Div.). Accord, id., [1974] 1 F.C. 410 at 412; 51 D.L.R. (3d)
632 at 634 (C.A.).
36. [1973]F.C. 394 at 402; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 603-604.
37. Id.
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exercised in favour of the defendants. The court had none of the
problems which the trial court seemed to experience on the question
of the power of the court, although it did not directly deal with that
aspect of the case. In fact, the appellate judgement specifically
stated that "we should not be taken as approving the trial judge's
reasoning as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the court to authorize
service exjuris." 3 8At the same time, the Federal Court of Appeal
emphasized with respect to Rule 307 that "the discretion arising
under it is . .. at large" because the "rule does not describe
categories of cases in which service exjuris may be allowed, as did
the former Admiralty Rules." 39 This language indicates, without
deciding, that the Trial Division had the power to serve the German
defendants. But the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the result of
the trial judge on the basis of the latter's discretionary power to
refuse to permit service ex juris, a judicial prerogative which
English courts delineated as part of Order 11 in 1885.40
The Federal Court Act itself gives little direct indication of
whether Parliament intended any territorial limits to the court's
jurisdiction, but one strong indicator appears in section 43. After
stating in subsection (1) that "the jurisdiction conferred on the
Court by section 22 may in all cases be exercised in personam,"
section 43 goes on to state in subsection (4) that no such in
personam action may be commenced in Canada for a ship collision
unless the defendant resides or has a place of business in Canada,
the cause of action arose there, or the parties agreed that the Federal
Court would have jurisdiction over the litigation. 4 1 This subsection
38. [1974] 1 F.C. 410 at 414; 51 D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 635.
39. [1974] I F.C. 410 at 412; 51 D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 634.
40. Socitj Gdralede Parisv. Dreyfus Bros. (1885), 29 Ch.D. 239 at 243-244,
rev'd on other grounds (1887), 37 Ch. D. 215 (C.A.). In the case on appeal,
Lindley, L.J., affirming the court below on the point, stated that "the language of
Order XI is [such that]. . . the Court has a discretion and is bound to exercise its
discretion [with respect to service ex juris]". (1887), 37 Ch.D. 215 at 225. The
decision of the lower court "has been regarded for many years as the first
authoritative statement of the doctrine" of forum conveniens. B. Inglis, Forum
Conveniens - Basis of Jurisdiction in the Commonwealth (1964), 13 Am. J.
Comp. L. 583 at 584 note 4.
In Oy Nokia, the Federal Court of Appeal was "of the opinion that the case is not
a proper one for the exercise of the discretion so as to compel the defendant, E.
Russ & Co., to defend the plaintiff's claim in this Court." [1974] 1 F.C. 410 at
414; 51 D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 635.
41. Section 43 reads in relevant part:
(1) Subject to subsection (4) of this section, the jurisdiction conferred on the
Court by section 22 may in all cases be exercised inpersonam.
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must have been meant to negate the inference which would arise
from section 22(3)42 that the Federal Court could entertain such
actions, regardless of where the defendant was or the cause of action
arose. If that is true, no other actions are so limited, and Rule 307
may mean what it appears to say: the Trial Division has world-wide
power to serve process ex juris, limited only by considerations
which it thinks are proper. Since the Federal Court of Appeal did
not deal with the parameters of Rule 307, the matter is worth
considering.
The Long Arm of the FederalCourt:Background to Rule 307
The lack of clarity of the Federal Court Act coupled with the
possible breadth of Rule 307 may have been a bit disconcerting to
the Oy Nokia trial court. It is, after all, the tradition in Canada to
have rules which specify the conditions under which service exjuris
may be ordered, and the lack of categories may have been
disturbing. In such a situation, a court has but a few alternatives
which are:
(1) that the Rule does not apply, because it does not specify
when it is applicable;
(2) to find, on the other hand, that the Rule permits service ex
juris in any sort of case where the court has subject-matter
competence; or
(3) to state that the Rule provides for service ex juris but that
such service must be limited somehow, and then find those
limitations by analogy to other rules or general principles of
jurisdiction.
Although the court in the Anglophoto4 3 case explored none of the
consequences of its holding, that case seems to point in the direction
of the first alternative. In Anglophoto the plaintiff argued that the
defendant Tacoma warehouseman on which plaintiff wished to
order service ex juris could be served as a "necessary and proper
... (4) No action in personam may be commenced in Canada for a collision
between ships unless

(a) the defendant is a person who has a residence or place of business in
Canada;
(b) the cause of action arose within the territorial, internal or other waters of
Canada; or
(c) the parties have agreed that the Court is to have jurisdiction.
42. Set out in note 6, supra.
43. Anglophoto Ltd. v. The Ship "Ferncliff', [1972] F.C. 1337 (Tr. Div.).
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party" as had been permitted under former Admiralty Rule 20(d).
The court held those rules to be inapplicable, as repealed; 44 in Oy

Nokia the same trial judge held further that the former Admiralty
Rules were not subsumed within the Federal CourtAct. 45 Taken to
their logical conclusion, these rulings would appear to mean that
none of the catergories in former Admiralty Rule 20 were carried
over by the Federal Court Act. Furthermore, as the trial court did
not apply Rule 307 , no service exjuris would ever be possible, for
if Rule 307 does not give the Federal Court the power it enjoyed
under subsection (d) of former Rule 20, perforce the same argument
should apply to all of the former Rule 20 categories. Doubtless the
trial court would not subscribe to such an extreme view. But its
opinion does not suggest a theory for limiting the scope of Rule 307.
In dealing with former Exchequer Court Rule 76, the direct
predecessor of Rule 307, the Supreme Court of Canada also
considered the problem of limiting scope, but did so under the
approach in the third alternative above, that is, by analogizing to
other jurisdictional rules. In Muzak Corp. v. C.A.P.A.C., 4 6three
out of five Supreme Court justices held that the combined effects of
Rules 7647 and 4248 of the former Exchequer Court and Exchequer
Court Act section 7549 made the English Order 11 rules applicable
to the Exchequer Court. Most importantly of all, although the
language of Rule 42 would not have appeared to require it, the
Muzak decision seems to mean that Order 11 not only set out
minimal parameters for service ex juris but actually limited the
scope of Rule 76 so that such service could not be ordered unless the
case fell within the scope of Order 11. Despite rule changes since
44. [1972]F.C. 1337 at 1341.
45. [1973] F.C. 394 at 402; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 597 at 603-604.

46. [1953]2S.C.R. 182; 19C.P.R. 1.
47. Set out in note 33, supra. Rule 76, as amended in 1964, was substantially the
same as it was when Muzak was decided.
48. Exchequer Court General Rules and Orders April 21, 1931, as amended to
April 9th, 1956. Rule 42 reads:
Practice and procedure not provided for by Statute or by these Rules
In any proceeding in the Exchequer Court respecting any patent of invention,
copyright, trademark or industrial design, the practice and procedure shall, in
any matter not provided for by an Act of the Parliament of Canada or by the
Rules of this Court (but subject always thereto) conform to, and be regulated by,
as near as may be, the practice and procedure for the time being in force in
similar proceedings in Her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature in England.
49. Set out in note 32, supra.
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Muzak, the case may indicate how Rule 307 is likely to be
interpreted.
In Muzak the respondent argued that Rule 76 was broader than
Order 11. In this case involving copyright infringement, the
respondent applied under Rule 76 for leave to issue notice of a
statement of claim upon the foreign appellant, a New York
corporation having its chief place of business in New York. The
lower court permitted the service, only to be reversed by the
Supreme Court. Three judges not only expressed the opinion that
the English Order 11 was read into the Exchequer Rules by virtue of
Rule 42 but viewed that "reading in" as limiting Rule 76 as well.
Mr. Justice Kellok expressly rejected the respondent's argument
that Rule 76 and Exchequer Court Act section 75 "constitute a
complete code of procedure and that Rule 42 does not apply so as to
involve the practice of the Supreme Court of Judicature in
England." 50 The respondent had failed to bring his case within the
51
categories of Order 11. Two other justices gave similar opinions.
The same "limiting" effect may be found both in C.A.P.A.C. v.
International Good Music Inc., 52 which relied in good part on
53
Muzak, and in later cases as well.
50. [195312 S.C.R. 182 at 194; 19 C.P.R. 1 at 15.
51. Cartwright J. agreed and explicitly stated that the case did not fall under any
of the relevant clauses of Order 11, s. 1 citing clauses (ee), (f) and (g). [1953] 2
S.C.R. 182 at 197; 19 C.P.R. 1 at 20. Kerwin J. would also have applied Order 11
and dissented in the decision of the case because the majority decided that plaintiff
had not brought itself within the rule. [1953)2 S.C.R. 182 at 188; 19 C.P.R. 1 at
10.
52. [1963] S.C.R. 136; 37 D.L.R. (2d) 1. In that case Martland J. reviewed the
plaintiff's affidavit for service ex juris and found that it met the requirements of
Rule 76 and Exchequer Court Act, section 75. He then turned to Rule 4 of English
Order 11 and applied the formal requirements of that Rule, except as those
requirements were implicitly modified by section 75 itself. Rule 4 of Order 11
required a showing as to whether or not the defendant was a British subject,
because under Rule 6 of Order 11, where defendant was neither a British subject
nor within the British Dominions, notice of the writ and not the writ itself was to be
served upon him. But section 75(1) of the Exchequer CourtAct, beginning with the
words "When a defendant, whether a British subject or foreigner, is out of the
jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court . . .

"

provided merely for a notice of the

statement of claim to be served in such circumstances Martland J.concluded that
the affidavit of the plaintiff did not have to state whether or not the defendant was a
British subject. The clear implication is that, if section 75 had not provided this
variance from Order 11, then Rule 4 of Order 11 would have been applicable.
53. Compare Dole Refrigeration Products Ltd. v. Canadian Ice Machine Co.
(1957), 27 C.P.R. 46 (Ex. Ct.) (English joinder rules utilized in silence of
Exchequer Court Rules), with Bain Ltd. v. The Ship "Martin Blake", [1955] Ex.
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Rule 42 expressly provided that in industrial and literary property
cases "the practice and procedure shall, in any matter not provided
for in any Act of the Parliament of Canada or by the Rules of the
Court ... conform to, and be regulated, as near as may be, the
practice and procedure for the time being in force in similar
proceedings in His Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature in
England." 54 Rule 2 had a similar effect in other actions. 55 But in
1966 Rule 42 was repealed and Rule 2, which was then made to
apply generally, stated that the Exchequer Court's practice and
procedure, in the absence of an applicable Rule or parliamentary
act,
shall be determined ... by analogy
(a) to the other General Rules and Orders of the Court, or
(b) to the practice and procedure in force for similar
proceedings in Courts of that province to which the subject
matter of the proceedings most particularly relates,
whichever is, in the 5opinion
of the Court, most appropriate
6
in the circumstances.
C.R. 241 (reference to English rules on extension of time would not be made where
inconsistent with implications of Admiralty Rules, applying Exchequer Rule 2).
54. Set forth in note 47, supra.
55. Exchequer Court General Rules and Orders, April 21, 1931, as amended to
April 9th, 1956 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956), Rule 2:
(1) In all suits, action, matters or other judicial proceedings in the Exchequer
Court of Canada, not otherwise provided for by any Act of the Parliament of
Canada, or any general Rule or Order of the Court, the practice and procedure
shall:-(a) If the cause of the action arises in any part of Canada, other than the
province of Quebec, conform to and be regulated as near as may be, by the
practice and procedure at the time in force in similar suits, actions and
matters in Her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature in England; and
(b) If the cause of action arises in the Province of Quebec, conform to and
be regulated, as near as may be, by the practice and procedure at the time in
force in similar suits, actions and matters in Her Majesty's Superior Court
for the Province of Quebec: and if there be no similar suit or matter therein
then conform to and be regulated by the practice and procedure at the time in
force in similar suits, actions and matters in Her Majesty's Supreme Court of
Judicature in England.
56. Exchequer Court General Rules and Orders, April 21, 1931, as amended to
April 8th, 1969 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969), Rule 2:
"In any proceedings in the Court where any matter arises not otherwise
provided for by any provision in any Act of the Parliament of Canada (except
section 34 of the Exchequer Court Act) or by any general rule or order of the
Court (except this rule), the practice and procedure shall be determined by the
Court (either on a preliminary motion for directions, or after the event if no such
motion has been made) for the particular matter by analogy

Oy Nokia and Order XI: Notes On Unstructured Bases of Jurisdiction 231

Rule 2, as amended, has been carried over practically verbatim to
57
become Rule 5 of the Federal Court.
All these rules were designed to fill any gaps in procedure which
might exist, but former Rule 42 was used to limit the impact of Rule
75 while amended Rule 2 was not in an analogous situation after
1966. In Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Ford Motor Co. of
Canada,58 the question was whether service exjuris of a third party
notice should be made under Rule 76 and section 75 of the
Exchequer CourtAct. The court held that it had jurisdiction to order
such service and "there is nothing in Rule 2 which circumscribes
this power or in the circumstances of this case makes applicable"
the Order 11 rules of Ontario, 59 which had the closest connection
with the case. A later case 60 explained Libbey-Owens-Ford as
holding that the Exchequer Court Act and Rules "dealt with the
situation and it was not necessary to apply Rule 2 so as to make" the
Ontario Order 11 rules applicable. 6 1 Contrasting amended Rule 2
with former Rules 2 and 42, one cannot see why the language of the
former rules would compel the "reading in" of the English Order
11 rules if the language of amended Rule 2 would not compel the
same effect by the Ontario rules. All that one can say is that the
Supreme Court in Muzak found something compelling about Rule
42 in conjunction with Rule 76 while the Libbey-Owens-Ford court
found no such compulsion under amended Rule 2.
In the Anglophoto62 case the unsuccessful plaintiff made the
argument that, even if Rule 307 did not permit service exjuris, the
court should utilize Federal Court Rule 5, the successor to Rule 2, in
order to "read in" Order 11, Rule l(g) of the British Columbia
rules, a rule substantially similar to former Admiralty Rule 20(d).
The trial judge rejected this method as being an improper utilization
of Rule 5 to increase the jurisdiction of his court. Doubtless if Rule
(a) to the other General Rules and Orders of the Court, or
(b) to the practice and procedure in force for similar proceedings in the Courts
of that province to which the subject matter of the proceedings most particularly
relates,
whichever is, in the opinion of the Court, most appropriate in the
circumstances."
57. The phrase "(except section 34 of the Exchequer Court Act)" is deleted and
subclause (a) has been changed to read "(a) to the otherprovisions of these Rules."
59. (1968) 55 C.P.R. 165 (Ex. Ct.).
59. Id. at 165-166.
60. Appliance Service Co. v. Sarco CanadaLtd. (1969), 58 C.P.R. 218 (Ex. Ct.).
61. Id. at 220.
62. Anglophoto Ltd. v. The Ship "Ferncliff', [1972] F.C. 1337 at 1341 (Tr. Div.)
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307 limited service exjuris in some way, Rule 5 should not be used
to increase jurisdiction, since a mere stop-gap procedural provision
ought not be used as the foundation for jurisdiction. 63 But that says
nothing about the scope of Rule 307.
The Federal Court of Appeal's opinion in Oy Nokia points away
from finding the kind of limitation which the Supreme Court found
in Muzak. In particular, one should note in Oy Nokia that the
appellate court cited Rand J. in Muzak, even though he was the only
justice sitting who specifically avoided discussion of English Order
11 .64 Furthermore, the broad reading of the Federal Court of Appeal
on subject-matter jurisdiction 6 5 would be consistent with a broad
reading of Rule 307. One can therefore infer that the potential
jurisdiction of the Federal Court over foreign persons is unlimited as
to geography but "that it must still be exercised with the caution"
traditionally employed. 6 6 As contrasted with the earlier Muzak
decision, Oy Nokia seems to make Rule 307 a truly unstructured
jurisdictional power.
The Desirabilityof an UnstructuredRule

The potential impact of a jurisdictional statute without express
limits is, of course, enormous. It means that the only constraint
upon the court which has such power is its own sense of when it
63. The English courts have stated on several occasions that Order 11 is merely
procedural. See, e.g. In re Liddell's Settlement Trusts, [1936] Ch. D. 365 at
371-373; this proceeds on the theory that the English courts always had jurisdiction
over foreign defendants but were unable to exercise it effectively due to a
procedural defect, corrected by Order 11. But there is little practical difference
between a situation where a court has jurisdiction but cannot exercise it and one
where the court just does not have jurisdiction. If one argued that the Federal Court
has jurisdiction worldwide but cannot exercise it under Rule 307, it would be
unwise to extend the scope of Rule 307 by means of a rather vague rule like Rule 5,
even if both rules were "procedural".
64 InMuzak Corporationv. C.A.P.A.C., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 182 at 190; 19 C.P.R. 1
at 12 Rand J. stated:
The rules of the Exchequer Court dealing with service of this nature are of a
most skeletal form. By rule No. 2 [sic] the practice and procedure not otherwise
provided shall conform to and be regulated as near as may be by that at the time
in force in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England; but it is not necessary,
for the purposes of this appeal, to treat the rules of Order No. 11 as being
applicable by reason of that provision.
65. The Robert Simpson MontrealLtd. v. Hanburg-AmerikaLinie Norddeutscher,
[1973] F.C. 1356; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 267 (C.A.)
66. Oy Nokia Ab v. The Ship "Martha Russ", [1974] 1 F.C. 410 at 412; 51
D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 634 (C.A.)
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would be unfair or unwise for the court to open its doors to
litigation. In theory, these same sorts of constraints were embodied
in structured jurisdictional rules. That is, Order 11 rules, with
various differences made by individual legislative and judicial
bodies, reflect the forum's view that it would be unfair or unwise to
67
decide litigation which did not fall within the letter and the spirit
of those rules. Order 11 rules expanded common law in personam
jurisdiction in five main categories so that the courts could serve
process exjuris. These were cases involving land within the forum's
territory, defendants who resided or were domiciled there,
necessary or proper parties to suits brought within the forum, torts
committed within the forum's territory, and contracts having a
substantial connection with the forum. 68 Some jurisdictions have
added a few miscellaneous categories*69 With these broad powers
available, what reasons are there for an unstructured rule, such as
Rule 307, exceeding the scope of these traditional rules, when these
70
rules themselves have been criticised as too broad?
Two main objections can be made against the usual structured
rules. First, they tend to be inflexible; and second, they tend to
focus judicial attention upon the factors set out in the rule, even
though the jurisdictional problem contained in a particular case
involves many relevant factors other than the one required in order
for the rule to be satisfied.
As for the first point, one can readily show that structured rules
have required reinterpretation to meet changing social and economic
conditions, and yet that such reinterpretation has been slow in
coming. A prime example is the rule which permits service exjuris
67. Compare Kroch v. Rossell et Cie Socit des Personnes t Responsabili
Limitie, [1937] 1 All E.R. 725; 156 L.T. 379 (C.A.) (although tort of publishing
libel had occurred within England, court would not authorize service ex juris
because overwhelming part of publication affected Europe, not England ), with
Oppenheimer v. Louis Rosenthal & Co., [1937] 1 All E.R. 23 (C.A.) (although
breach of German contract fortuitously occurred in England, court took jurisdiction
when plaintiff showed he would not receive fair trial in Germany).
68. See generally, Note, British Precedentsfor Due Process Limitations on In
PersonamJurisdiction(1948), 48 Colum. L. Rev. 605.
69. E.g., Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario,
R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 545, Rule 25 (1) (c) and (e) concerning wills and
administration of estates of persons dying domiciled within the jurisdiction, and
Rule 25(1) (k), concerning actions in contract or alimony where the defendant has
minimum assets of $200 within the jurisdiction.
70. E.g., George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chemical Corp., [1944]
1 K.B. 432 at 437; [1944] 1 All E.R. 386 at 388 (C.A.) (noting continental
criticism of English rules).
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"where the action is founded on a tort committed within" the
jurisdiction. 71 For many years, the rule was held inapplicable unless
both the act causing injury and the injury itself took place within the
forum's geographical territory. 7 2 The constraints of old interpretation were not easily shaken. Exceptions were made for libel cases,
for instance, by interpreting the "publication" of a libel as being
made within the jurisdiction, when in fact the physical reality may
have been otherwise. 73 In Canada, one court was willing to say that
an act of fraudulent misrepresentation fell within its jurisdiction
when the plaintiff both heard and acted upon a misrepresentation
within the forum, even though the defendant spoke the words of
misrepresentation into a telephone in another province. 74 But in an
English case, CordovaLand Co. v. Victor Brothers,75 the court on
analogous facts came to the opposite conclusion. A misrepresentation made by the defendants in Boston while contemplating that "it
would in due course be received by, and acted upon," by persons
such as plaintiff, was nevertheless not a tort committed in England
because "the substance of wrongdoing occurred in the United States
76
of America."
Is the fact that the defendant's act was completed outside the
jurisdiction that significant? The Supreme Court of Canada has not
felt it to be so. In Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 77 the
Court said that jurisdiction could be taken where damage occurred
in the forum's territory and the defendant had caused the damage by
putting a defective product into the normal channels of trade, when
it would be reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff might consume
it and be harmed within the forum's territory. The decision is in tune
with the current need for local power over foreign manufacturers,
71. E.g. Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario,
R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 545, Rule 25 (1) (g); Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, S.I.
1965/1776, Order 11, r. 1 (England).
72. E.g. George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chemical Corp., [1944]
K.B. 432; [194411 All E.R. 386 (C.A.): Abbott- Smith v. Governors of University
of Toronto (1964), 49 M.P.R. 329; 45 D.L.R. (2d) 672 (N.S.C.A.).
73. E.g., Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] O.R. 240; [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526; Bata v.
Bata, [1948] W.N. 366 (Eng. C.A.). Compare Kroch v. Rosseltet Cie socigtg des
Personnesi
tResponsabilitJLimitge [1937] 1 All E.R. 725; 156 L.T. 379 (C.A.).
74. Original Blouse Co. v. Bruck Mills Ltd., (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 174
(B.C.S.C.). See S. Hebenton, Jurisdiction:The PlaceWhere the Tort is Committed
(1966), 2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 361.
75. [196611. W.L.R. 793 (Q.B.D.).
76. Id. at 801.
77. [197511 S.C.R. 393; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 239; [1974] 2 W.W.R. 586.
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despite the difficulties in resolving the issue of when negligent
78
caused damage could "foreseeably" occur in another province.
That difficulty does not exist with an intentional one, as the
defendant clearly contemplates damage within the forum's territory.
In such an instance, is there any reason why it would be unfair to the
defendant to say that he must defend himself against a claim of
damage in the very place where he intended to cause it? In this
respect Cordova appears to be motivated by a need for doctrinal
consistency, lacking any articulated need for adhering to the rigid
79
position taken.
78. The question of the degree of foreseeability necessary for jurisdiction to be
taken will certainly arise in Canada, as it has in the United States. In Gray v.
American Radiator& StandardSanitary Corp. (1961), 22111. 2d 432; 176 N.E. 2d
761, defendant Ohio Manufacturer of an allegedly defective valve shipped the
valve to a Pennsylvania corporation. The latter incorporated the valve in a hot water
heater, which "in the course of commerce" was sold in Illinois and injured
plaintiff there. There was no evidence that the defendant had done any other Illinois
business, directly or indirectly. The court took jurisdiction, pointing out that
"defendant does not claim that the present use of its product in Illinois is an
isolated instance" and that "it is a reasonable inference that its commercial
transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use and
consumption in this state." Compare O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc. (1963),
123 Vt. 461; 194 A.2d 568, where it was held that "[t]he bare allegation that the
defendant at Newark, New York, put its product 'into the stream of commerce',
without more, is insufficient to show a voluntary contract or intentional
participation in Vermont." The O'Brien court held that it would be contrary to the
due process clause of the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, to take
jurisdiction over the defendant. The opposite conclusion was reached in Gray. The
same issue arises under statutory construction or even as a matter of judicial
discretion: at what point does the relationship between the defendant's act and the
forum become so tenuous that taking ofjurisdiction would be inappropriate?
79. Cf. Cheshire, note 24 supra at 280. In Murphy v. Envin-Wasey, Inc. (1972),
460 F.2d 661 (1st Cir.), the court held that, where a defendant non-resident
"knowingly sends into a state a false statement, intending that it should there be
relied upon to the injury of a resident of that state, he has, for jurisdictional
purposes, acted within that state." Id. at 664. In Murphy the representation was
mailed from outside the state to plaintiff within the state. On the other hand, in
Gluck v. Fastig Tipton Co. (1972), 63 Misc. 2d 82; 310 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct.),
where a Kentucky surgeon falsely certified a mare, knowing that the certificates
would be relied upon in New York, the court held that the act of misrepresentation
did not take place in New York, This decision though, was required by Kramer v.
Vogl (1966), 17 N.Y.2d 27; 267 N.Y.S.2d 900; 215 N.E.2d 159, standing for the
proposition that where "the representation in question had originally been made to
plaintiff outside the jurisdiction and was then subsequently confirmed by letter to
him inside the jurisdiction. jurisdiction would no lie." Polish v. Threshhold
Technology, Inc. (1972), 72 Misc. 2d 610; 340 N.Y.S.2d 354 at 356 (Sup. Ct.).
Both of these cases are based on statutory construction. In Hoppenfeld v. Crook
(1973), 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.) writ of error refused, no error,a Texas
court held that a tort had been committed within Texas by misrepresentation made
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Primafacie the Cordova and Moran cases are irreconcilable, but
one can reconcile them. One needs to look at the entire situation of
litigation, not just the nature of the tortious act. For example, the
defendant in Moran was shipping a great number of products
outside its home province and, while it had no property, assets,
salesmen, or agents in the forum's territory, it sold its product to
distributors located there and contemplated the resale of its products
there. In the traditional English and Canadian sense, the defendant
was not "doing business" within the forum's territory because it
lacked a fixed place of business80 and an agent for service of
process, 8 ' yet it was clearly drawing remuneration from activities in
connection with the forum. In Cordova, on the other hand, there is
no indication that the defendants had any sort of continuous
business involving England. Comparing the two cases, one could
argue that the Moran defendant might fairly be subjected to a
jurisdiction in which it had committed a negligent tort connected
with an ongoing commercial relationship, whereas the Cordova
defendant might not be fairly subjected to a jurisdiction with which
its sole connection was an isolated intentional tort, where the
defendant acted completely outside the forum territory. By viewing
the overall situation and not focussing exclusively on the factors
necessary for fulfilling the statutory requirements, we can possibly
justify the results in both cases. 82
This comparison illustrates the second problem with structured
jurisdictional rules; on their own terms, they do not permit the
courts to articulate factors which might be involved in the decision
to take jurisdiction when such factors fall outside the structural
categories. As the illustration shows, many factors may be relevant
to the jurisdictional problem, not merely those which are contained
within the structured rule.
in New York to plaintiff with the intent that plaintiff rely on them in Texas.
However, the court held that despite this intent, there were insufficient contacts
between the New York defendants and Texas for the Texas court to take
jurisdiction. Hoppenfeld, holding on the constitutional requirements of the due
process clause, Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution, seems
somewhat contradictory to the Murphy case, supra. However, the overall contacts
between defendants and forum in Murphy were far greater than those between
defendants and forum inHoppenfeld, and this may explain the difference.
80. E.g., Okura & Co. v. ForsbackaJernverksAktiebolag, [1914] 1 K.B. 715 at
718 (C.A.).
81. E.g., Murphy v. PhoenixBridgeCo., (1899), 18 P.R. 495 (Ont. C.A.).
82. Such factors as the residence of the plaintiff may, in certain instances, convert
an unfair taking ofjurisdiction over a foreign defendant into a fair one. In Seymour
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Let us compare the situation in Moran,83 which involved a
substantial manufacturer of lightbulbs, with a hypothetical situation
concerning a rather small-scale candlemaker. We suppose that both
the lightbulb manufacturer and the candlemaker are located in
province A and that each sells his full output in province A.
However, the lightbulb company sells to local distributors who ship
all over Canada, whereas the candlemaker sells only to a small retail
outlet in province A. A tourist from province B purchases a
lightbulb and a candle in province A. Both are defective. The tourist
is injured by each product in province B, where he first uses them.
May we conclude that, despite the parallel torts and the equal
"foreseeability" of where the product is going, that the lightbulb
manufacturer may be fairly brought into province B's court while
84
the candlemaker may not?
This problem has been raised and discussed elsewhere. 85 What is
merely being suggested here is that structured jurisdictional statutes
stand in the court's way and discourage its focussing upon such
factors as the nature and quality of the tortfeasor and his relationship
with the forum, not to mention the plaintiffs connection with the
v. Parke,Davis & Co., (1970), 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir.) affg (1969), 294 F. Supp.
1257 (D.N.H.), defendant's sole contact, with the forum, New Hampshire, were
the presence of its salesman and a certain amount of advertising there. All orders
for goods sold in New Hampshire were made through Massachusetts and
defendant's branch office was in Massuchusetts. Under the circumstances,
defendant could be said to be doing business in New Hampshire, but, as plaintiffs
cause of action arose solely in Massachusetts and plaintiff went to New Hampshire
only to avoid the Massachusetts statute of limitations, the court felt that fairness to
the defendant would not permit taking of jurisdiction in New Hampshire. The
plaintiff having no contacts with the forum, the defendant's contacts were
insufficient to make the choice of forum a fair one. But compare Maharanee of
Baroda v. Wildenstein, [1972] 2 Q.B. 283; [1972] 2 All E.R. 689 (C.A.) (Indian
plaintiff could sue French defendant in England, despite fact defendant was served
with process in England on temporary visit).
83. Moran v. Pyle National (Canada)Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 395; 43 D.L.R. (3d)
239; [1974] 2. W.W.R. 586.
84. Some may argue that, despite its contacts with province B, even the lightbulb
manufactuer should not have to defend there. If so, change the facts somewhat:
have each manufacturer sell its product to the tourist knowing that he comes from
province B and that he will not consume the product until he returns home. Some
may now argue that both manufactuers should be subject to province B's
jurisdiction. But surely that ought not be the case with the candlemaker, who has
quite tangential contacts with province B whereas the lightbulb manufacturer has a
continuous relationship and it was merely fortuitous that the injury which occurred
in B arose out of a bulb sold in A rather than in B.
85. A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis (1966), 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 at 1169.
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forum and the problem under consideration. 86 The emphasis in
structured rules is entirely upon the factors indicated by the rule
itself, with other factors perhaps being considered afterwards under
the doctrine offorum conveniens.
One more illustration will show the disadvantages of structured
rules. Suppose that an Ontario plaintiff enters into a contract with a
New York defendant to purchase a power generator from the
defendant and have defendant install and service it. The New York
defendant initiates the contact in Ontario between the parties,
although the defendant has no fixed place of business or agent there.
All negotiations except the final session and the signing of the
contract take place in Ontario. Ontario law governs the contract, but
the defendant does not specifically consent to Ontario jurisdiction.
Delivery and installation of the generator is made in Ontario as is
payment. In fact, all of defendant's obligations must be discharged
in Ontario, except for one: the defendant must stock certain
disposable items to be used on the generator, and defendant is
obligated only to deliver those items to plaintiff at defendant's New
York plant. This obligation defendant breaches. Had any other
obligation been breached, the present Ontario rules would have
covered the jurisdictional problem. 87 But here, because the specific
obligation was neither breached nor required to be performed within
Ontario, there is no jurisdiction. In the context of a case which has
far more contacts with Ontario than with New York, the result is
unwarranted.
Naturally, the result could be changed by adopting the English
rule8 8 which would put jurisdiction in Ontario because the proper
law of the contract was Ontario. Yet the fact the the parties might
have selected New York law to govern their obligations should not
radically change the fact that Ontario is at least as proper a forum as
New York.
The arguments against having unstructured, open-ended jurisdictional rules is that they may encourage excessive utilization of local
jurisdictional power, that they do not provide sufficient guidelines
for potential foreign defendants to plan their affairs so as to avoid

86. See id. at 1167.
87. Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario, R.R.O.
1970, Reg. 545, Rule 25 (1) (f).
88. Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, S.I. 1965/1776, Order XI, r. 1 (1) (f)
(England).
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the forum's jurisdiction, and that they may be too confusing to
apply. 89 None of these points is completely convincing.
In practice, English and Canadian courts have made sparing use
of their present power under Order 11 statutes, erring on the side of
refusing to take jurisdiction in the doubtful cases rather than taking
jurisdiction in the ones which are borderline. 90 As the Federal Court
of Appeal emphasized in Oy Nokia, "the discretion arising under
[Rule 307] is

. .

. at large, but it must still be exercised with...

caution." 9 1 The mere opportunity to take jurisdiction has not
persuaded the courts to do so where they have felt it unjustified, and
there is no reason to believe that this general policy would be
abandoned under an unstructured rule.
The second point is somewhat more telling. Can foreign
defendants plan their affairs properly if they cannot insulate
themselves from potential forums with which they have little
contact? In fact, potential foreign defendants can and will take
refuge behind their home jurisdiction's rules with respect to the
rocognition of foreign judgements when the forum has made an
excessive claim to local jurisdiction. If a businessman who operates
in country A is called upon to defend himself in country B, and he
has no contacts or interests within country B, then he will simply
ignore the law suit. If he has present interests there or thinks he will
have future interests, he will go in and defend himself. 92 In fact, his
concern about the entry of a judgment against him in country B is a
fairly good indicator in itself that he has contacts with country B.
The counter argument, of course, is that there will be situations
where the defendant has some interests within the forum's territory,
89. Cf. L. De Winter, Excessive Jurisdictionin PrivateInternationalLaw (1968),
17 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 706 at 719-720.
90. See, e.g., George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chemical Corp.
[1944] 1 K.B. 432; [1944] 1 All E.R. 386 (C.A.); The Brabo, [1949] 1 All E.R.
294 at 298 (H.L.); Beaver Lamb & Shearling Co. v. Sun Insurance Office, [1951]
O.R. 401 [195113 D.L.R. 470 (H.C.).
91. Oy Nokia Ab v. The Ship "Martha Russ", [1974] 1 F.C. 410 at 412; 51
D.L.R. (3d) 632 at 634.
92. See, e.g., Somportex, Ltd. v. PhiladelphiaChewing Gum Corp.[1968] 3 All
E.R. 26 (C.A.) Defendants were contemplating expansion of their operations to
England, and consequently protested jurisdiction against them by putting in a
conditional appearance. The jurisdictional point was decided against them, and
they were also held to have submitted to English jurisdiction. The English
judgement was recognized in the United States. Somportex v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp. (1971), 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied (1972), 405
U.S. 1017. The defendants clearly had taken their chances in England because of
their contemplated future operations there.
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and yet those interests - even coupled with the contacts involved in
the situation about which the plaintiff complains - are insufficient
to justify a taking of jurisdiction. The defendant, the arguments
runs, is being put in the position of sacrificing those interests or else
defending on the merits in a forum inconvenient to him.
Defendant's dilemma should be resolvable by giving him the
opportunity of arguing his jurisdictional point to the forum tribunal
without submission for recognition purposes. The forum may then
make a measured determination as to the fairness of subjecting the
defendant to its legal processes. The fact that the standards by which
the forum determines its jurisdiction is not structured into categories
should not be particularly burdensome upon the defendant. Many of
our jurisdictional rules (forum conveniens, for instance) are
judicially developed and can only be interpreted by case law. If the
entire jurisdictional rule were judicially developed that ought not be
such a catastrophe or any more difficult to understand than is the
common law itself.
There is, finally, the point that unstructured rules may be less
easily applied by the courts than structured ones. One writer has
suggested that if we "take into consideration all circumstances of a
specific case . . . we will run into the same confusion and

uncertainty as has been created by part of contemporary American
doctrine with respect to choice of law problems." 93 The criticism
leveled at the "no rules" school of choice of law has charged that
adoption of unstructured rules in choice of law puts courts in
confusing "three dimensional chess games", a situation completely
inappropriate to the necessity of dealing with high-volume problems
of administration of justice. 94 That criticism, though, is less easily
leveled at questions of local jurisdiction, because the problems have
not merely as many dimensions. The focus is on the law of the
forum in local jurisdictional questions, not on two or more possible
laws. To a far lesser extent that in analogous choice of law problems
there may be an exploration of other jurisdictions as possible
alternative forums. But in most cases the laws of other jurisdictions
are not considered. Finally, the present structured rules are still
available as guide lines to solve the easy cases. For the harder ones,
though, involving less clear contacts by the overall situation with
93.
Int.
94.
551

L. De Winter, Excessive Jurisdictionin Private InternationalLaw (1968). 17
& Comp.L.Q. 706 at 719-720.
M. Rosenberg, Comment on Reich v. Purcell (1968), 15 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.
at 644.
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the forum, the court may well need to look at other elements of the
situational scenario.
In conclusion, therefore, the Federal Court of Appeal decision in
Oy Nokia, if it was meant to cast Rule 307 as an unstructured rule of
jurisdiction, opens very important opportunities to the Canadian
federal court system. In practice, one doubts very much if Rule 307,
so construed, will greatly increase the Federal Court's taking of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants. On the other hand, there is a
very real opportunity for the Federal Court to enunciate the sort of
factors which it considers to be important in taking jurisdiction,
freed from the traditional mold of Order 11. A clear exposition in
judgments will, in the long run, permit potential defendants to plan
their affairs and result in the kind of fairness and reason which one
expects from jurisdictional rules.
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